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Assessing Plain and Intelligible Language in the Consumer Rights Act: A role for 
reading scores? 
Abstract 
Under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 consumer contracts and consumer notices are 
required to be expressed in plain and intelligible language. This is a difficult concept to 
capture. Determining whether a contract is expressed in plain and intelligible language 
involves resource intensive work by regulators and difficult adjudications by courts. This 
paper explores whether reading scores present a viable alternative. Can a simple computer 
program tell a consumer, a business, a regulator or the court that a particular contract is 
not expressed in plain and intelligible language? The paper begins by exploring the concept 
and role of plain and intelligible language in the Consumer Rights Act, before considering 
the ways that reading scores have developed and been used in legal contexts. We then 
report on the findings of an experimental examination of insurance contracts using a 
basket of reading scores, using our findings to draw conclusions about the utility of reading 
scores in determining whether a contract is expressed in plain and intelligible language. 
We find that reading scores can play a role in such determinations, but that further work 
is needed to provide appropriate tools for business, regulators and courts to use in 
assessing plain and intelligible language. 
Introduction 
The requirement of transparency, which requires contracts to be drafted in plain and 
intelligible language and, if written, be legible, plays a key role in the governance of 
consumer contracts.1 Businesses are incentivised to ensure plain and intelligible language 
                                           
1 Transparency is also required by other legislative instruments. A key example is Regulation 2016/679 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
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in two ways. First, through protection from scrutiny of core terms expressed, inter alia, in 
plain and intelligible language.2 Second, by the possibility of regulatory action (including 
an injunction) when a term or contract is not expressed in plain and intelligible language,3 
whether or not the terms are substantively unfair. Therefore, it is necessary to have a 
clear understanding of meaning of plain and intelligible language, and for business and 
regulators to operationalise the concept in order to assess whether contracts satisfy 
regulatory requirements. Businesses can then draft compliant contracts, and regulators 
can take enforcement action against non-compliant ones.  
Reading scores are an increasingly popular method for assessing contractual language and 
identifying contracts that are too difficult for the average consumer to understand. 
Advocates of the use of reading scores identify them as a “simple, inexpensive way to 
measure the comprehensibility of legal language,”4 something that is particularly useful 
when enforcement budgets are strained.5 Legislators, particularly in the United States, 
have used reading scores when seeking to reduce the complexity of legal documents, 
providing a clear target standard that documents must reach.6 Compliance with such 
                                           
data (‘GDPR’) article 12(1) (information should be provided in “concise, transparent, intelligible and easily 
accessible form, using clear and plain language”). 
2 Hans Erich Brandner and Peter Ulmer, 'The Community Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: Some 
Critical Remarks on the Proposal Submitted by the EC Commission' (1991) 28(3) Common Market Law Review 
647, 656. 
3 Consumer Rights Act 2015 section 68 and schedule 3 paragraph 3(5), removing any doubts about the existence 
of such a power (see Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National [2008] EWHC 875 (Comm); [2008] 2 All E.R. 
(Comm) 625, [86]). 
4 Robert W Benson, ‘The End of Legalese: The Game is Over’ (1984-85) 13 Review of Law and Social Change 
519, 547. 
5 See Christopher Hodges, Law and Corporate Behaviour: Integrating Theories of Regulation, Enforcement, 
Compliance and Ethics (Hart 2015) Chapter 14 part II. 
6 See below, text to note 107ff. 
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standards can, in theory, be assessed with the application of a simple computer 
programme.  
This paper seeks to explore plain and intelligible language requirements in UK consumer 
contracts law, and consider whether reading scores can (or cannot) provide a simple 
mechanism for determining whether a clause, or a document, is compliant with these 
requirements. It begins by considering in Part 1 the requirement that contracts be 
expressed in plain and intelligible language in its regulatory context, before turning to 
examine the development of reading scores in Part 2, examining some of the most 
common formulae used to determine readability. The use of reading scores to assess legal 
language is considered in part 3, before part 4 reports on an empirical test of the utility of 
reading scores in determining whether a contract is expressed in plain and intelligible 
language. Part 5 draws on the results of this empirical examination to make policy 
recommendations about the proper role of reading scores in the process of determining 
whether contract language is plain and intelligible.  
1 - Consumer contracts and plain and intelligible language 
Standard form contracts dominate the relationship between consumers and traders. 
Consumers are not in a position to negotiate the terms of the contracts, and such contracts 
are often made on a “take-it or leave-it” basis, giving businesses a high level of control of 
the terms of those contracts.7 The power imbalance has resulted in protection for 
consumer from the effects of the traders’ ability to impose contract terms determined by 
                                           
7 See Friedrich Kessler, ‘Contracts of Adhesion – Some thoughts about freedom of contract’ (1943) 43 Columbia 
Law Review 629-642 and Arthur Allen Leff, ‘Contract as Thing’ (1970) 19 American University Law Review 131-
157. 
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them.8 This regulation of contract terms provides the background to the requirement that 
consumer contracts be expressed in plain and intelligible language. 
From Contractual Freedom to Consumer Contractual Regulation 
At common law there were few doctrines that allowed courts to interfere with the terms 
of a contract.9 Exclusion and limitation clauses, which eliminated or reduced the innocent 
party’s entitlement to damages, were seen as particularly likely to give rise to unfairness.10 
However, courts would not engage in the rewriting of contracts and would not refuse to 
enforce certain terms to prevent unfairness.11 Interpretive rules were used to ameliorate 
harshness,12 interpreting clauses in the manner most favourable to the party against whom 
they were used.13 These contra proferentem rules were perhaps the closest common law 
precursor to the requirement to draft contracts in plain and intelligible language. Drafters 
were incentivised to ensure that the effect of their term was clear in order to ensure that 
the term would operate in the way they intended. Beyond interpretation, arguments were 
directed against the incorporation of such terms,14 with emphasis placed on the 
                                           
8 See Director of Fair Trading v First National Bank Ltd [2001] UKHL 52; [2002] 1 AC 481, [31] per Lord Steyn. 
9 The penalty jurisdiction is a notable exception. The development of the doctrine is summarised in Cavendish 
Square Holding BV v Makdessi; ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis (‘ParkingEye’) [2015] UKSC 67; [2016] A.C. 1172. 
10 Cyril Grunfeld, ‘Reform in the Law of Contract’ (1961) 24 MLR 62, 64. 
11 See e.g. Denning LJ’s statement in Karsales (Harrow) Ltd. v Wallis [1956] 1 WLR 936, 940 that the introduction 
of limitations on the scope of exclusion clauses was “[n]otwithstanding earlier cases which might suggest the 
contrary.” 
12 For example the ‘rule’ that prevented the application of exclusion clauses in cases of fundamental breach, 
disapproved by the House of Lords in Suisse Atlantique Société d'Armement Maritime S.A. v N.V. Rotterdamsche 
Kolen Centrale [1967] 1 AC 361. 
13 The contra proferentem rule(s) are retained by the Consumer Rights Act section 69(1). 
14 For example, cases such as Parker v Southeastern Railway (1877) 2 CPD 416; Olley v Marlborough Court 
[1949] 1 QB 532; and Interfoto v Stilletto [1989] QB 433. 
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prominence of a term which could not be incorporated into the contract unless the party 
had notice of them.15 
However, the common law was not thought to be sufficiently protective.16 In order to 
provide a legislative safeguard the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (‘UCTA’) was passed. 
This applied to both business-to-business and business-to-consumer contracts. Under 
UCTA courts could, in closely defined circumstances,17 adjudicate whether exclusion and 
limitation clauses18 were “reasonable.” UCTA did not separately regulate contractual 
wording, but the intelligibility of a term could be taken into account in assessing whether 
a term was reasonable.19 
Further protection was provided for consumers by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1994 (‘UTCCR 1994’), which implemented the Unfair Terms Directive.20 The 
UTCCR 1994 were repealed and replaced by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999 (‘UTCCR 1999’). The primary function of the Unfair Terms Directive was 
to enable courts to decide whether terms were “fair.”21 This statutory intervention provided 
significantly improved protection for consumers, widening the scope of protection beyond 
exclusion and limitation clauses and allowing substantive issues to be canvassed. As a 
                                           
15 All terms in a signed contract will be incorporated (see L’Estrange v Graucob [1934] 2 KB 394). 
16 See Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Report 69: Exemption Clauses - Second Report (Law 
Commission 1975) para [11]. 
17 The term must fall within sections 2, 3 or 6, and the liability must relate to the course of a business or the 
occupation of the premises. A clause in a contract of the type set out in schedule 1 cannot be reviewed. 
18 The extended meaning given to such clauses covered by the Act are set out in section 13.  
19 See e.g. Overseas Medical Supplier Ltd v Orient Transport Services Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 273, 280. 
20 Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts. 
21 See Hans Erich Brandner and Peter Ulmer, above n2, and Elizabeth McDonald, ‘The emperor's old clauses: 
unincorporated clauses, misleading terms and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations’ (1999) 58(2) 
CLJ 413. 
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subsidiary matter, regulators and courts were required to assess whether core terms were 
expressed in plain and intelligible language when determining their jurisdiction, and given 
a power to assess all terms for linguistic compliance. 
As part of the recent attempt to consolidate consumer contract law,22 rendering it less 
complex, less fragmented and clearer,23 with respect to consumer contracts the CRA 2015 
repealed and replaced UCTA and the UTCCR 1999.24 UCTA continues to govern exclusion 
and limitation clauses in business to business contracts. Part 3 of the CRA implements the 
Unfair Terms Directive in a similar manner to UTCCR 1999. However, as the Directive 
requires only minimum harmonisation,25 the UK has chosen to go beyond the minimum 
standards prescribed by providing that the CRA applies to individually negotiated 
contracts, imposing a requirement of prominence and legibility if a trader seeks to exempt 
a core term from scrutiny and applying the provisions to notices as well as contracts. 
Under the CRA most of the terms in a consumer contract are subject to a test of fairness. 
The test is set out in CRA section 62(4). This provides that “[a] term is unfair if, contrary 
to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights 
and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer.”26 If a term is unfair 
                                           
22 A consumer contract is “a contract between a trader and a consumer” (CRA section 61(1)). “consumer” and 
“trader” are defined in CRA section 2(2).  
23 CRA 2015 Explanatory Notes para [6]. 
24 For general consideration of the Act see Denis Barry et al, Blackstone’s Guide to the Consumer Rights Act (OUP 
2016), Simon Whittaker, ‘Distinctive features of the new consumer contract law’ (2017) 133 LQR 47; and Paula 
Gilliker ‘The Consumer Rights Act 2015 – a bastion of European consumer rights?’ (2017) 37(1) Legal Studies 
78. 
25 See Stephen Weatherill, EU Consumer Law and Policy (Edward Elgar 2013) chapter 3. 
26 The test for fairness was set out by the CJEU in Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa 
[2013] 3 CMLR 89, which was cited approvingly by the Supreme Court in ParkingEye, above n9, where the key 
principles of the Aziz decision are set out at para [105]. The term in question was found to be fair.  
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it does not bind the consumer in his or her dealings with the trader.27 The rest of the 
contract will continue, “so far as practicable, to have effect in every other respect.”28  
The fairness test is not explored in detail in this article. Instead, this article focuses on the 
requirement that contractual terms be expressed in plain and intelligible language.29 This 
requirement plays two roles in the scheme of the CRA. First, (along with the requirements 
of prominence30 and legibility31) it governs the subject matter scope of the section 62 
fairness jurisdiction. If a term which relates to the main subject matter of the contract or 
the price payable is not expressed in plain and intelligible language then it may be 
subjected to scrutiny to assess whether it is fair. If such a term is expressed in plain and 
intelligible language, is legible and is prominent then it will be exempt from the test of 
fairness (‘the core terms exception’).32 The core terms exception seeks to encourage clarity 
in contract drafting.33 Second, the requirement that a contract is expressed in plain and 
intelligible language is a standalone ground for regulatory action, which applies whether 
                                           
27 CRA 2015 section 62(1) 
28 CRA 2015 section 67. 
29 CRA 2015 section 64(3). 
30 A term is prominent if “it is brought to the consumer’s attention in such a way that an average consumer would 
be aware of the term (CRA section 64(4)). An average consumer is “reasonably well-informed, observant and 
circumspect” (see Peter Cartwright ‘The Consumer Image within EU Law’ in Christian Twigg-Flesner (ed), 
Research Handbook on EU Consumer and Contract Law (Edward Elgar, 2016)).  
31 Legibility is a UK law addition to the criteria contained in the Directive (Law Commission, Advice to the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (Law Commission 2013), [4.3]), aimed at ensuring that the 
“consumer [is] actually be given an opportunity to examine all the terms” (Unfair Terms Directive recital 20). 
The legibility concept is beyond the scope of this paper. 
32 Consumer Rights Act 2015 section 64. 
33 Hans Erich Brandner and Peter Ulmer, above n21, 656. 
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or not a contract term is fair.34 This focuses on the drafting of the boilerplate terms of the 
contract rather than on the core terms.  
Plain and Intelligible Language 
The requirement of plain and intelligible language is an important tool for ensuring that 
consumers are aware of the terms of trade.35 Once a consumer is aware of the terms then 
he or she can make the choice not to engage with the trader on those terms,36 forcing the 
trader to either change the term(s) or to exit the market.37 Plain and intelligible terms are 
therefore an aid to market discipline,38 and the requirement can therefore be seen as a 
less interventionist approach to governance of unfair terms, as it empowers the 
consumer,39 rather than interferes with the contract.40 The linkage of the core terms 
exemption and plain and intelligible language allows consumers to understand those terms 
                                           
34 Consumer Rights Act 2015 section 68. 
35 Information about the terms of trade is essential to the ability of consumers to make an informed choice in 
the market (see Iain Ramsay Rationales for Intervention in the Consumer Marketplace (OFT 1984), [3.8]). 
36 Ramsay, Ibid. [3.26]-[3.28]; Hugh Collins, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law’ (1994) 14(2) Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 229, 238 who states “Clarity is essential for effective market competition between terms. What 
matters primarily for EC contract law is consumer choice…”  
37 Peter Cartwright, Consumer Protection and the Criminal Law (CUP 2001), 6. 
38 In contrast see Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, ‘Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection: A Critique 
of European Consumer Contract Law’ (2013) 50(Special Issue) CMLR 109 “people do not pay attention to 
standard forms…” 
39 In contrast see Stephen Weatherill, ‘Empowerment is Not the Only Fruit’ In Dorota Leczykiewicz and Stephen 
Weatherill (eds), The images of the consumer in EU Law: Legislation, free movement and competition law (Hart 
2016) 212-214. 
40 Hans Erich Brandner and Peter Ulmer, above n2, 656. 
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that they must read in order to make an informed choice,41 with the fairness test policing 
those terms that the average consumer does not read.42  
The Unfair Terms Directive requires “plain intelligible language” in Article 4(2) and “plain, 
intelligible language” in Article 5. This presents a slight contrast to CRA 2015 section 64(3), 
which requires “plain and intelligible” language (authors’ emphasis). It is unclear whether 
the textual difference, which seems to make “plain” and “intelligible” separate criteria to 
be satisfied, will make any difference to the interpretation of the concept by the UK courts. 
This question arises particularly post-Brexit, where it appears that recourse to the CJEU 
to ensure consistency of interpretation may not be possible.43 However, it does raise the 
possibility that separate tests and methodologies may be appropriate for determining 
whether a contract is plain and whether it is intelligible. 
The concept of plain and intelligible language has been subject to a variety of 
interpretations. The CJEU has held that the requirement should be interpreted broadly, 
particularly because of the role it plays in excluding core terms from scrutiny.44 Therefore, 
linguistic assessment “cannot be reduced merely to [a contract] being formally and 
grammatically intelligible,”45 although a contract which fails to meet this test may not be 
seen as sufficiently “plain.” The assessment of language must also take into account 
whether the average consumer would be able to understand “potentially significant 
                                           
41 This assumes that the consumer reads even the core terms of the contract. See Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-
Shahar, above n38, and Christian Twigg-Flesner, ‘The Importance of Law and Harmonisation for the EU’s 
Confident Consumer’ in Dorota Leczykiewicz and Stephen Weatherill (eds), The images of the consumer in EU 
Law: Legislation, free movement and competition law (Hart 2016) 189.  
42 Mindy Chen-Wishart, ‘Transparency and Fairness in Bank Charges’ (2010) 126 LQR 157. 
43 Department for Exiting the European Union, ‘The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the 
European Union White Paper’ (DExEU, 2017) para [2.3]. 
44 See Case C-26/13 Kásler and Káslerné Rábai [42]. 
45 Case C-96/14 Van Hove v CNP Assurances SA [40]. 
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economic consequences” of the term of the contract.46 The requirement of plain and 
intelligible language therefore requires drafters to ensure that the effect of the term is 
communicated to the consumer. If the drafter fails to carry out this task the core term can 
be subject to scrutiny using the fairness test.47  
The mechanism for testing contracts for plain and intelligible language is underdeveloped. 
Courts have tended to make evaluative decisions based on the reading of the terms in 
their contractual context. In Office of Fair Trading v Foxtons,48 it was held that “just 
because a highly skilled lawyer can find (or contrive) some equivocation in a word, that 
does not make the language lacking in plainness or intelligibility”49 and that the 
assessment “does not require an absolute and pedantic rigour.”50 However, a contract 
would not comply where it uses “broad terms of uncertain meaning… [w]ithout some form 
of definition.”51 This guidance leaves the determination to the judge, without fully fleshing 
out what is meant by plain and intelligible, particularly for the average consumer. In Office 
of Fair Trading v Ashbourne Management Services a term is seen as plain and intelligible 
if a consumer who reads the agreements “reasonably carefully” can understand the effect 
of the terms.52 
In Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National Andrew Smith J decided that terms must be 
“sufficiently clear to enable the typical consumer to have a proper understanding of them 
for sensible and practical purposes.”53 This does not explain how the assessment of this 
                                           
46 Ibid. [47].  
47 Of course, a core term that is not transparent, but is fair, binds the individual consumer. 
48 [2009] C.T.L.C. 188. 
49 Ibid. [62]. 
50 Ibid. [63]. 
51 Ibid. [62]. 
52 Office of Fair Trading v Ashbourne Management Services Ltd [2011] CTLC 237, [158]. 
53 Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National, above n3, [119]. 
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test is to be carried out. It is clear that non-contractual documentation available prior to 
the conclusion of the contract can be taken into account in determining whether a term 
was intelligible.54 This has particular importance in complex financial transactions. Further, 
layout can be relevant to the assessment, with “useful headings and appropriate use of 
bold print” making a contribution to the intelligibility of a document.55  
The role of the average consumer in the assessment of plain and intelligible language is 
under-explored.56 Whilst the average consumer is specifically mentioned in the test of 
prominence,57 it is not referred to in either the Unfair Terms Directive or the CRA when 
assessing plain and intelligible language.58 At first instance in Abbey National, Andrew 
Smith J held “whether terms are in plain intelligible language is to be considered from the 
point of view of the … average consumer. The… ‘average consumer … who is reasonably 
well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect’ … provides an appropriate 
yardstick guide to whether a term is in plain intelligible language.””59  
However, the identity of the average consumer is not explored in the cases, with little 
attention given to the characteristics of such a consumer in the unfair terms context. In 
Foxtons there was little “evidence or other material to assist [the judge] in determining 
                                           
54 Ibid. [92]. 
55 Ibid. [104]. 
56 Contrast the GDPR, above n1, recital 58 (“any information and communication, where processing is addressed 
to a child, should be in such a clear and plain language that the child can easily understand”) and article 12(1). 
This is discussed in Growing Up Digital Taskforce, Growing Up Digital: a report of the Growing Up Digital Taskforce 
(Children’s Commissioner 2017) available at 
<http://www.childrenscommissioner.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Growing%20Up%20Digital%20Task
force%20Report%20January%202017_0.pdf> (last visited 14th February 2017), 12. 
57 See n30 above. 
58 Hans Schulte-Nolke et al (eds), EC Consumer Law Compendium: A Comparative Analysis (2008), 398. 
59 Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc, above n3, para [89]. 
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the mindset, thinking or attributes of a typical consumer” and therefore assessment would 
be made “on an analogous footing to that on which the court approaches the attributes of 
the reasonable man in other realms.”60 It is likely that the average consumer for whom 
language is assessed will be the average consumer in the targeted group. So if an 
insurance contract is targeted at a particular group of individuals, when assessing plain 
and intelligible language the average consumer will be the average consumer of that 
group.61 That the targeted standard applies in unfair terms cases is made clear in 
Ashbourne Management Services, where Kitchin J held that “[t]he question whether a 
particular term is expressed in plain intelligible language must be considered from the 
perspective of an average consumer. Here such a consumer is a member of the public 
interested in using a gym club which is not a high end facility and who may be attracted 
by the relatively low monthly subscriptions.”62  
Even if the average consumer is the benchmark against which plain and intelligible 
language is assessed, in contrast to the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008 (‘CPUTR 2008’), no consideration is given to the proper consumer 
standard if a clearly identifiable group of consumers that is particularly vulnerable is 
foreseeably likely to enter into the contract.63 The 2008 Regulations provide that where a 
vulnerable group is “particularly vulnerable to the practice or the underlying product… in 
a way which the trader could reasonably be expected to foresee” then “reference to the 
average consumer shall be read as referring to the average member of that group.”64 The 
unfair terms case law does not seem to allow consumer vulnerabilities to be taken into 
                                           
60 Above n48, [31]. 
61 Made explicit in the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (‘CPUTR’) regulation 2(4). 
62 Above n52, para [155]. 
63 In the CPUTR 2008, vulnerability exists on account of “mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity” (regulation 
2(5)). 
64 Ibid. 
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account where the vulnerable group is not specifically targeted. The cases repeated 
reference to the “average consumer”65 or the “typical consumer”66 seem to suggest that a 
standardised approach will be adopted, without taking into account the reading skills of 
vulnerable consumers, even where they are foreseeably likely to enter into contracts on 
those terms.67 
In the light of the failure of the UK courts to flesh out the concept, the Competition and 
Markets Authority has offered an account of the characteristics of a plain and intelligible 
document.68 This guidance is, amongst other things, intended to assist business in drafting 
contracts, protecting their core terms from scrutiny and ensuring consumers can make an 
informed choice.69 First, the document should be jargon free, and should “as far as possible 
use ordinary words in their normal sense”. This will not to prevent the use of technical 
language where the meaning of the language is clear to the consumer.70 However, such 
statements raise the question of who the consumer is, what is clear to them, and whether 
some technical language can ever be clear. Second the document should be unambiguous, 
meaning “clear and not open to misinterpretation or differing interpretations;” third it 
should be reader-friendly, including “organised so as to be easily understood (using, for 
example, short sentences and subheadings);” fourth, it must be comprehensible with “the 
meaning of the words or concepts used, as well as the reasons for them… explained if they 
are not capable of being readily understood by consumers;” fifth, it should be informative, 
                                           
65 Ashbourne Management Services, above n52, para [155]. 
66 Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc, High Court, [119]; Foxtons [29]. 
67 It may be possible that terms that are particularly damaging to vulnerable consumers are misleading actions 
under CPUTR. 
68 Competition and Markets Authority, Unfair Contract Terms Explained (CMA, 2015) para [40]. 
69 Above text to note 35ff. 
70 For example in consumer insurance contracts (see Janet O’Sullivan and Jonathan Hilliard, The Law of Contract 
(7th ed OUP, 2016), 217).  
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so that “a consumer should, on the basis of the information provided – if necessary in pre-
contractual literature – be able to foresee and evaluate the consequences of all wording 
used;”71 and sixth, accompanied by pre-contractual literature as necessary, for example 
“if, for instance, the contract is complex or lengthy.” 
Whilst providing a useful typology, and whilst such a multifactorial approach is useful 
allowing decision-makers to take into account various different matters in judging whether 
language is plain and/or intelligible, the concepts used in the typology suffer from a lack 
of theoretical or empirical grounding. They do not, by themselves, provide a simple way 
of measuring whether a clause or a contract is transparent, but instead provide a series 
of matters that a decision-maker may take into account in making an evaluative judgment 
about whether a contract is expressed in plain and intelligible language. It is accepted that 
providing a simple measure is a difficult task, but it is one that should be undertaken in 
an attempt to ensure that the important concept of plain and intelligible language is 
sufficiently certain. If not, there may be uncertainty for businesses, who cannot easily 
judge whether their contracts are compliant, and difficulty for consumers, who are unable 
to easily decide whether the core terms are challengeable or not, particularly in 
circumstances where they are not legally advised. Further, it is more expensive to conduct 
a multifactorial approach then to have a simple metric that can determine whether a 
contract is expressed in plain and intelligible language. Reading scores, examined in Parts 
2 to 4 are an attempt to simplify the assessment of contractual language and reduce the 
time and expense of a multifactorial approach.  
The problems caused by this broad multifactorial approach are exacerbated by the general 
requirement of plain and intelligible language imposed in the CRA. When assessing the 
applicability of the core terms exception, the linguistic examination is limited to terms 
                                           
71 Reflecting the decision in Van Hove above n45. 
This is the accepted version of this article and will subsequently appear in a typeset form 
in the journal. It should only be used for private research and study and may not be 
distributed further. The version of record can be accessed at [add doi when available] 
 
15 
 
governing price and subject matter. However, the Section 68 provides that a trader must 
ensure that a “written term of a consumer contract… is transparent.” Therefore, all terms 
in consumer contracts must be expressed in plain and intelligible language. It is 
questionable whether the concept of plain and intelligible language is subject to the same 
test under section 68 as that set out in core terms exemption. Boilerplate terms may not 
have “significant economic consequences,”72 but may significantly affect the rights and 
obligations of the parties to the contract.73 It is, therefore, necessary to examine whether 
the term as written allows the contracting parties to understand this.   
Where a contract is not transparent, regulators may take action under CRA Schedule 3 
and apply for an injunction (or accept an undertaking) that prevents a trader using that 
term. The injunction jurisdiction is necessary as “one cannot think of a more expensive or 
frustrating course than to seek to regulate… ‘contract’ quality through repeated lawsuits 
against inventive ‘wrongdoers,’” 74 and consumers either cannot or will not take private 
law actions.75 By giving power to regulators to take enforcement action to prevent the use 
of unclear contracts, regulation seeks to provide a better mechanism to improve the 
quality of contracts compared to consumer civil actions.76 However, in times of austerity,77 
the enforcement of the linguistic requirements is likely to be limited. Regulators will only 
                                           
72 Of course, consequences of, for example, exclusion and limitation clauses may be significant in economic 
terms. 
73 E.g. an arbitration clause. 
74 Arthur Allen Leff, ‘Unconsionability and the Crowd: Consumers and the Common Law Tradition’ (1970) 31 
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 349, 356.  
75 Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (OUP 1999), 87-93. 
76 See Iain Ramsay, Consumer Law and Policy: Texts and Materials on Regulating Consumer Markets (3rd edn 
Hart 2012) 317-320. 
77 Christopher Hodges, above n5 Chapter 14 part II. 
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take action in high impact cases.78 A compliance focused, responsive regulation,79 
approach is likely to be adopted, with engagement with the trader in order to co-
operatively lead to changed, plain and intelligible, terms. If a simple test could be 
developed, this would allow regulators to engage with lack of compliance on a more regular 
basis, providing a simple starting point to negotiated changes to the terms used by 
businesses.80 
In an attempt to develop a better understanding of the concept of plain and intelligible 
language, we considered whether reading scores could provide an accurate test of whether 
a document was expressed in plain and intelligible language. If this could be determined 
by a reading score this would be extremely helpful to consumers, regulators and traders 
as documents could be scrutinised in an efficient and cost effective manner using a simple 
computer programme.81 We chose to examine the exclusions in consumer insurance 
contracts. Whilst these exclusions would initially appear to be subject a fairness test and 
a section 68 assessment, in consumer insurance contracts these clauses are core terms 
as they define the subject matter (the scope of the insurers risk) and the price (as they 
contribute to “calculating the premium paid by the consumer”).82 Therefore, in the rest of 
this paper we are considering the contribution that reading scores can make to the 
assessment of core terms, although, where necessary, we discuss the potential of reading 
score in assessing whether boilerplate is expressed in plain and intelligible language. Our 
findings are set out in the following sections. 
                                           
78 Such as Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National, above n3, and Foxtons, above n50. 
79 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (OUP 1992); 
and Cartwright, above n37, 220-222. 
80 Ramsay, above n76, 320-330 and Susan Bright, ‘Winning the Battle against Unfair Contract Terms’ (2000) 
20(3) Legal Studies 331. 
81 The ease of reading scores as a tool for assessing compliance is noted by Benson, above n4. 
82 Directive 93/13/EEC recital 19. 
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2 – The Development of Reading Scores 
Reading scores attempt to quantify the ease with which readers are able to read and 
comprehend written texts.83 Such scores have long been used to assess a variety of texts. 
They seek to provide a simple measure of how readable a piece of text is, in order that a 
writer can assess and amend the text to make it understandable to readers.84 
In one of the earliest attempts, Thorndike compiled a list of 10,000 words occurring in 
general literature by frequency of use, suggesting that the readability of written texts 
could be determined mathematically.85 Thorndike’s list served as partial basis for one of 
the earliest readability formulae, published by Vogel and Washburne, known as the 
Winnetka formula.86 It considered factors such as the number of different words per 1000 
words, the number of uncommon words (words not on Thorndike’s list) per 1000 words, 
the number of prepositions per 1000 words, and the number of simple sentences in 75 
successive sentences. Readability scores were computed for passages from 700 books and 
validated against children’s paragraph-meaning scores (a measure of reading 
comprehension of those passages). 
                                           
83 Jeanne S Chall and Edgar Dale, Readability Revisited: The New Dale-Chall Readability Formula (Brookline 
Books 1995) 79-80 define a readability formula as “an equation which combines those text features that best 
predict text difficulty. The equation is usually developed by studying the relationship between text features (e.g., 
words, sentences) and text difficulty (e.g., reading comprehension, reading rate, and expert judgment of 
difficulty).” 
84 Such is the function of the reading scores built in most word processing programmes (see for example 
<https://support.office.com/en-gb/article/Test-your-document-s-readability-85b4969e-e80a-4777-8dd3-
f7fc3c8b3fd2> (last visited 9th February 2016). 
85 Edward L. Thorndike, The Teacher's Word Book (Teacher’s College, Columbia University 1921). 
86 Mabel Vogel and Carleton Washburne, ‘An objective method of determining grade placement of children's 
reading material’ (1928) 28(5) The Elementary School Journal 373-381. 
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Later work conducted by Waples and Tyler87 and Ojemann88 explored other factors beyond 
word frequency that may influence readability, and the following three decades saw the 
development of a number of readability measures whose subsequent revisions are still in 
widespread use today. Flesch developed the Flesch reading-ease score (FRES),89 which 
assigns texts a numerical score between 0 and 100, with lower scores indicating more 
difficult texts. The formula uses the ratio between the total number of words and the total 
number of sentences, and the ratio between the total number of syllables and the total 
number of words. It is calculated as follows: 
 
𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑆 = 206.835 − 1.015 ∗ (
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
) − 84.6 ∗ (
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
) 
 
The formula was subsequently revised with different weights to produce a score 
interpretable as the target U.S. grade level of the text, or the number of years of formal 
schooling required to understand its content.90 The Flesch-Kincaid (F-K) grade level is 
computed as follows: 
 
                                           
87 Douglas Waples and Ralph W Tyler, What People Want to Read About (University of Chicago Press, 1931). 
88 Ralph Ojemann, ‘The Reading Ability of Parents and Factors Associated With the Reading Difficulty of Parent 
Education Materials’ (1934) 8 University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare 11. 
89 Rudolph Flesch, ‘A New Readability Yardstick’ (1948) 32(3) Journal of Applied Psychology 221. 
90 J. Peter Kincaid et al, Derivation of New Readability Formulas (Automated Readability Index, Fog Count and 
Flesch Reading Ease Formula) for Navy Enlisted Personnel (No. RBR-8-75) (Naval Technical Training Command 
1975). 
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𝐹𝐾 = 0.39 ∗ (
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
) − 11.8 ∗ (
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
) − 15.59 
 
Another popular formula, the Gunning FOG Index, was created by Robert Gunning,91 and 
is computed as follows: 
 
𝐹𝑂𝐺 =  0.4 ∗  [(
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
) + 100 ∗ (
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
)] 
 
where “complex words” are defined as words containing three or more syllables. 
McLaughlin subsequently formulated an alternative to the FOG Index,92 called the SMOG 
Index, which produced a grade level estimate using the following formula: 
 
𝑆𝑀𝑂𝐺 = 1.0430 ∗  √𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 ∗
30
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
+ 3.1291 
The measures described thus far include the number of syllables as a factor. However, the 
syllable structure of English is quite complex and varied, making automatization of syllable 
counting problematic. To address this, two measures were developed to expedite the 
automation of readability computations, and were based on the number of characters 
                                           
91 Robert Gunning, The Technique of Clear Writing (McGraw-Hill 1952). 
92 G. Harry McLaughlin, ‘SMOG Grading - a New Readability Formula’ (1969) 12(8) Journal of Reading 639. 
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(letters) per word instead of syllables. These are the Automated Readability Index (ARI)93 
and the Coleman-Liau Index (CLI)94:  
 
𝐴𝑅𝐼 = 4.71 (
𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
) + 0.5 (
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
) − 21.43 
 
𝐶𝐿𝐼 = 0.0588 ∗ 𝐿 − 0.296 ∗ 𝑆 − 15.8 
‘ 
where L is the average number of characters per 100 words, and S the average number 
of sentences per 100 words. 
Considerable debate exists as to the relative merits of formulae based on characters versus 
syllables, but ARI and CLI owe much of their popularity to the relative ease and reliability 
with which computer programs can compute the number of characters of English words as 
opposed to the number of syllables they contain. Syllable-based measures computed by 
different analytical tools can produce more or less significant discrepancies depending on 
the particular syllable parsers (computer programmes that identify the syllables in the 
words assessed, in order that the number of syllables can take their place in the formula) 
employed and the specific assumptions these make. For example, some syllable parsers 
might treat “fine-tuning” as two words, and others as one. These differences during 
parsing can have a noticeable impact on the grade level estimate. Marchand, Adsett and 
                                           
93 E. A. Smith & R. J. Senter, ‘Automated Readability Index’ (1967) AMRL-TR. Aerospace Medical Research 
Laboratories (6570th), 1. 
94 Meri Coleman and T. L. Liau, ‘A Computer Readability Formula Designed for Machine Scoring’ (1975) 60(2) 
Journal of Applied Psychology 283. 
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Damper provide a useful overview and comparison of different rule-based and data-driven 
syllabification algorithms.95 It is important to note that there is no uniform methodology 
for parsing, and therefore a clear risk that different parsers come to different outcomes. 
Beyond those examined in this section, hundreds of different readability measures have 
been formulated (for English and for other languages), and a review of all of them is 
beyond the purview of this article. Despite the large number of readability measures, all 
the formulae described in this section remain in widespread use. One of the uses that the 
reading scores have been put to is examining legal documents. Before using these formula 
to examine sample contracts, it is useful to consider the academic and legislative uses of 
reading scores to scrutinise legal language, and particularly contracts.  
3 - The Use of Reading Scores in Assessing Legal Language 
Reading scores are increasingly being used in legal scholarship and legal policy, often as 
an aid to challenges to “legalese,” which is seen as too arcane and difficult to understand.96 
The linguistic requirement in the CRA seeks to challenge such language. Therefore, it is 
natural to consider whether reading scores can help the requirement of plain and 
intelligible language achieve its policy goal. 
Academically, a number of studies have examined legal, or quasi-legal, documents for 
readability. Reading scores have been used to examine tax legislation in Australia97 and 
New Zealand.98 Sutherland used the Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level 
                                           
95 Yannick Marchand et al, ‘Automatic Syllabification in English: A Comparison of Different Algorithms’ (2009) 
52(1) Language and Speech 1. 
96 Benson, above n4. 
97 David Smith and Grant Richardson, ‘The Readability of Australia's Taxation Laws and Supplementary Materials: 
An Empirical Investigation’ (1999) 20 Fiscal Studies 321. 
98 Adrian Sawyer, ‘New Zealand's Tax Rewrite Program - In Pursuit of the (Elusive) Goal of Simplicity’ (2007) 4 
British Tax Review 405, and the articles cited therein.  
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formulae to examine collective bargained agreements in Australia,99 using the results to 
assess whether the policy goal of ensuring “simple agreements” had been achieved. 
Rogers et al have used reading scores to analyse the readability of Miranda100 warnings 
given to suspects in the USA.101 
In the UK, reading scores have been used to examine consumer contracts, including those 
on the internet.102 Linsley and Lawrence examined the risk disclosure section of annual 
reports of Public Listed Companies using Flesch Reading Ease scores, and found the 
disclosures were difficult or very difficult to understand.103 On the policy front, in their 
examination of children’s digital lives, the Growing Up Digital Taskforce used a Flesch-
Kincaid reading score to evaluate the terms and conditions of Instagram.104 The terms 
were found to be “difficult to read” with “language and sentence structure that only a 
postgraduate could be expected to understand.”105 Consumer groups have used reading 
scores in an attempt to encourage traders to redraft their contracts. For example, Fairer 
Finance found that “the average insurance document is only accessible to someone in the 
last year of Sixth Form College.”106  
                                           
99 Carolyn Sutherland, ‘The Elusive Quest for Simplicity: Measuring and Assessing the Readability of Enterprise 
Agreements, 1993 to 2011’ (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 349. 
100 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 US 436. 
101 Richard Rogers et al, ‘The Language of Miranda Warnings in American Jurisdictions: A Replication and 
Vocabulary Analysis’ (2008) 32 Law and Human Behavior 124. 
102 Mark Hochhauser, ‘Compliance vs. Communication’ (2003) 50 Clarity: Journal of International Movement to 
Simplify Language 11; Stuart Moran, Ewa Luger and Tom Rodden, ‘Literatin: Beyond Awareness of Readability 
in Terms and Conditions’ (2014) Proceedings of Ubicomp ’14. 
103 Philip M Linsley and Michael J Lawrence, ‘Risk Reporting by the Largest UK Companies: Readability and Lack 
of Obfuscation’ (2007) 20 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 620. 
104 Growing Up Digital, above n56. 
105 Ibid. 8. 
106 See Fairer Finance, ‘Insurance and banking customers need a PhD to understand the small print’ available at 
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The use of reading scores are embedded in some US legislation,107 requiring contracts 
(including insurance contracts) to have a particular level of readability.108 For example, in 
Texas a consumer banking contract which is not concluded on model contract provisions 
must meet prescribed Flesch-Kincaid reading scores, as calculated by Microsoft Word.109 
Similarly, the South Carolina code requires that loan contracts have a Flesch-Kincaid score 
of “no higher than seventh grade.”110 The Montana code provides that an insurance policy 
cannot be issued in Montana unless “the text achieves a minimum score of 40 on the 
Flesch reading ease test.”111 There have been some moves towards the use of reading 
scores in financial documentation in Canada, but legislative action has been stalled 
because French language reading scores are not felt to be sufficiently developed to provide 
an appropriate legislative benchmark.112 Sirico is critical of these developments, arguing 
that the legislation requiring the use of reading scores does not protect consumers.113 He 
                                           
 <http://www.fairerfinance.com/about-us/media-relations/insurance-and-banking-customers-need-a-phd-to-
understand-the-small-print> 
107 See, in general, Carl Felsenfeld, ‘The Plain English Movement’ (1982) 6 Canadian Business Law Journal 408. 
108 See John Aloysius Cogan Jr, ‘Readability, Contracts of Recurring Use, and the Problem of Ex Post Judicial 
Governance of Health Insurance Policies’ (2010) 15(1) Roger Williams University Law Review 93, 120 note 105 
and see generally Michael S. Friman, ‘Plain English Statutes’ (1995) 7 Loyola Consumer Law Reporter103; 
Rebecca Pressman, Legislative and Regulatory Progress on the Readability of Insurance Policies (Document 
Design Center 1979); and Calvin J. Karlin, ‘Readability Statutes - A Survey and a Proposed Model’ (1980) 28 
University of Kansas Law Review 531. 
109 Texas Administrative Code title 7 section 90.1045. 
110 Code of Laws of South Carolina 1976 title 37 chapter 3 section 202. 
111 Montana State Code title 33 chapter 15 section 325. The Montana code provides detailed methodology for 
use in calculating the Flesch reading ease score. 
112 See e.g. Ontario Securities Commission Bulletin Issue 33/40s4 (October 08, 2010) Appendix A available at 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_rule_20101008_81-101_pos-oscb_3340-sup-4.htm> (last visited 
16th February 2017). 
113 Louis J. Sirico, Jr, .Readability Studies: How Technocentrism Can Compromise Research and Legal 
Determinations (2008) 26(1) Quinnipiac Law Review 147. 
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further argues that the calculation of Flesch-Kincaid scores on Microsoft Word is not in 
accordance with the standard formula as it fails to count syllables, and instead uses 
number of characters as a substitute.114 This has particular implications for the Texas 
statute discussed above. 
Given the trend towards using reading scores to assess contracts, it is timely to consider 
whether such scores could, and should, be used in the assessment of plain and intelligible 
language. In the next part we apply the reading scores considered in Part 2 to consumer 
insurance contracts in order to consider their utility in assessing the linguistic compliance 
of contracts. 
4 - Testing Insurance Contracts 
Textual extracts of general exclusion clauses from seven different consumer travel 
insurance documents were scrutinised.115 These seven insurance policies were selected 
randomly from a population of consumer travel insurance contracts selected by the authors 
using a price comparison website. The authors made four separate searches and harvested 
the policy wordings returned in response.116 The four searches were as follows: a two week 
break in Europe;117 a two week break outside Europe (excluding US and Canada);118 a two 
week break in the US;119 and an annual travel insurance policy.120 A number of policy 
wording were returned multiple times in response to each of the searches, and where the 
                                           
114 Ibid. 165-166. 
115 Documents on file with the authors. 
116 For the purpose of the search the traveller was assumed to have no pre-existing conditions, and did not 
require any special insurance covering winter sports or business travel. 
117 n=113. 
118 n=108 
119 n=111 
120 n=112. 
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wording of the exclusions was the same these were removed from the population. Each 
exclusion wording was assigned a number and seven were randomly selected. The policies 
analysed were all issued by different companies. The analysed sections ranged between 
568 and 1747 words in length. Where necessary, texts were formatted to remove 
numbered/alphabetised lists and bullet points, but leaving the sentences otherwise intact 
(including numbers when embedded in sentences). 
The goal of this examination was to achieve a better understanding of the utility of reading 
scores for assessing the concept of plain and intelligible language. We also attempted to 
test if the reading scores measured consumer understanding using questioning about the 
effect of the terms contained in the contract. Consumers were provided with the contracts 
and were given a series of 28 vignettes relating to losses incurred during a holiday,121 and 
asked whether the insurance responded to the risk. Two example vignettes are set out in 
Figure 1. The answers given were then coded as correct or incorrect, with incorrect 
answers indicating consumer inability to understand the effects of the term. The findings 
are used to draw conclusions about the usefulness of reading scores in assessing whether 
language is plain and intelligible, and whether they should be used by courts, regulators 
and traders. 
Figure 1: Example Vignettes 
Example Vignette 1: Ben is travelling with his friend Steve. Steve has been taking heavy 
antibiotics and had been advised to cancel his trip. A few days into the trip, his condition 
worsens to the point of requiring emergency medical care and causing Ben to have to 
cancel the rest of the holiday. Will Ben be able to claim compensation under this policy? 
 
Example Vignette 2: Sarah has booked a holiday in Kenya, but, shortly before she is 
due to fly there, the holiday resort is shut down due to civil unrest in the region and 
credible bomb threats. Will Sarah be able to claim her money back under this policy? 
                                           
121 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (2nd edn OUP 2004). 
This is the accepted version of this article and will subsequently appear in a typeset form 
in the journal. It should only be used for private research and study and may not be 
distributed further. The version of record can be accessed at [add doi when available] 
 
26 
 
 
Consumer insurance contracts were selected as the subjects of the study for a number of 
reasons. First, plain and intelligible language, and the protection from scrutiny under the 
CRA it affords, is particularly important in the insurance industry as both insuring clauses 
and exclusions are “core terms.”122 Collins suggests that this broad conception of core 
terms “threatens to exempt insurance contracts from control by the back door.”123 This 
means that the conceptualisation of plain and intelligible language is particularly important 
for consumers and insurers, as large parts of insurance contracts can be protected from 
substantive scrutiny by virtue of the core terms exception.124 Therefore, a well-developed 
concept of plain and intelligible language is particularly necessary in this area. 
Second, consumer insurance contracts are pervasive. Most consumers will hold insurance 
against some risks.125 The wording of insurance contracts can have important implications 
for consumers’ entitlements. The harshness of the contractual position, that consumers 
are not entitled to an indemnity in the event that they fall within exclusions, has been to 
some extent ameliorated by the availability of the Financial Ombudsman Service,126 who 
have shown a willingness to uphold some complaints about the application of an exclusions 
where a matter appears to fall strictly within the policy wording.127 However, it is still the 
case that consumer can often find themselves without compensation after suffering injury 
                                           
122 Directive 93/13/EEC recital 19 provides “the terms which clearly define or circumscribe the insured risk and 
the insurer's liability shall not be subject to [a fairness] assessment.”  
123 Hugh Collins, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law’ (1994) 14(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 229, 243. 
124 See e.g. Bankers Insurance Co Ltd v South [2003] EWHC 380 (QB); [2003] P.I.Q.R. P28. 
125 For example, buildings and contents insurance, car insurance, travel insurance, pet insurance, gadget 
insurance, etc. 
126 See generally Walter Merricks, ‘The Financial Ombudsman Service: Not Just an Alternative to Court’ (2007) 
15(2) Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 135.  
127 See e.g. Ombudsman News Issue 29 Case 29/1.  
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due to the terms of an exclusion in an insurance contract. Further, travel insurance is likely 
to be the most complex financial product that consumers buy on a year-to-year basis, and 
therefore provides a useful case study for considering reading scores. 
We subjected each extract to analysis using a number of different reading score formulae. 
We computed the readability measures described above (FK, FOG, SMOG, ARI, and CLI) 
for our seven extracts. The readability measures were computed for each text using six 
different analytical tools/calculators. These included the koRpus R package for text 
analytics (version 0.06-5);128 using the English version of the TreeTagger parser (version 
3.2.1);129 an online implementation of koRpus; and four other freely available online tools 
capable of computing the required readability measures.  
There are differences in the reading scores returned by the different indicators. This can 
be seen in Table 1, which shows the different scores returned by the different indicators 
using each different method of calculating the scores for one of the insurance documents 
examined during the project. The reading scores calculated vary from around 13 years of 
education using CLI to almost 20 of education using FOG. As seen above in part 2, each 
indicator is examining different characteristics of the contract, and therefore each provides 
potentially valuable information on readability. By choosing one indicator, the complexity 
measured by other indicators is lost, and therefore documents that may be challenging in 
a way captured by a particular score will not be identified if a different reading score is 
chosen as the measure of plain and intelligible language.130 
                                           
128 M.Eik Michalke, koRpus: An R Package for Text Analysis (Version 0.06-5) (2016) Available at 
<http://reaktanz.de/?c=hacking&s=koRpus> (last visited 15th February 2017). 
129 Helmut Schmid, ‘Improvements in Part-of-Speech Tagging with an Application to German’ (1995) Proceedings 
of the ACL SIGDAT-Workshop. 
130 This is a particular risk in the legislative approach taken in those States in the USA where one formula is used 
(see above text to note 107ff). 
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Table 1 – Reading Score in years of education by Formulae and Calculator for 
Travel Insurance Contract 1 
  Reading Score Formulae   
 
 Automated 
Readability 
Index 
Coleman-
Liau 
Index 
Flesch-
Kincaid 
Gunning 
FOG 
Index 
SMOG Mean Standard 
Deviation 
R
e
a
d
in
g
 S
c
o
r
e
 C
a
lc
u
la
to
r
s
 
koRpus 
(R) 
14.81 12.73 14.47 16.49 16.82 15.06 1.65 
koRpus 
(online) 
16.27 13.22 16.88 21.08 18.21 17.13 2.86 
Readability 
Consensus 
Calculator 
16.9 12 17 20.3 15.4 16.32 3.0 
OnlineUtility 17.11 12.99 17.62 19.7 18.13 17.11 2.49 
Perry 
Marshall 
16.9 13.8 17 20.4 15.5 16.72 2.43 
Readability 
Test Tool 
16.9 13.8 17 20.4 15.5 16.72 2.43 
 Mean  16.48 13.09 16.66 19.72 16.59 
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 Standard 
Deviation 
0.86 0.68 1.10 1.64 1.32 
  
 
Further, it was noticed that there were differences between the scores calculated by 
different calculators. For example, the calculations of FOG have a range for years of 
education that differs by 4.59. This is due to potential (and not necessarily transparent) 
differences between parsing algorithms for syllables used by different analytical 
calculators. This is potentially problematic for regulators, businesses and consumers, as 
although a reading score may be perceived to be fixed, is clearly not. This means that the 
legality of contract terms, or a decision to take enforcement action, may be dependent on 
which calculator is used. This is particularly problematic if a stakeholder uses a reading 
score as a proxy for plain and intelligible language, where the same document can appear 
to be transparent when using one calculator, but not if another is used. One solution is to 
be prescriptive as to the methodology by which the score will be calculate, favouring one 
calculator and/or method of calculation.131 However, such a prescription has the potential 
to embed problematic calculation errors within the concept of plain and intelligible 
language, with the score produced by a chosen calculator leading to a conclusion that a 
document does or does not reach a set reading score threshold that is used to determine 
that it is plain and/or intelligible, and therefore is or is not transparent. 
Therefore, it is argued that a better approach would be to pool grade-level estimates 
produced by different measures and calculators together to produce a consensus as to the 
readability of each text under analysis. Pooling these estimates would produce a single 
Grand Weighted Mean grade level for each text under investigation. We suggest that an 
approach has the potential to eliminate some of the measurement issues that arise in the 
legislative and regulatory use of reading scores. Such an approach has not been used by 
                                           
131 As in the Montana State Code, above n111. 
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stakeholders, who often rely on one formula or one calculator or both. In order to produce 
the Grand Weighted Mean, each calculator was used to produce all five of the readability 
measures (ARI, CLI, FK, FOG, SMOG) for each text. Then, for each text, grand means 
were computed for each measure across the different calculators, and for each calculator 
across different measures. Greater weight was assigned to those measures and calculators 
providing more consistent results and less weight to those yielding greater variance. The 
process was repeated to obtain a single Grand Weighted Mean grade-level estimate of 
readability for each text. This is a novel approach, taking publically available tools and 
utilising them, whilst attempting to resolve inconsistencies in calculation. This approach 
has high utility for users such as regulators, business and consumers, who are not 
equipped to engage in ad hoc calculation of reading scores or to create bespoke ‘better’ 
reading score methodologies,132 but who wish to utilise widely available tools to assess 
contractual language. 
The Grand Weighted Means are set out in Table 2. Testing indicates that more than 19 
years of formal education (beyond a Master’s Degree) is required to understand Legal Text 
2, while Legal Text 5 needs just under 14 years (second year of university). Despite Text 
5 achieving the lowest reading score, none of our texts appear to be particularly plain and 
intelligible. Unless the average consumer (if involved in the linguistic analysis) were 
conceptualised as having the reading ability of at least a second year university student 
then it would appear that, in a system that assessed compliance by utilising reading scores 
alone, then all of our insurance texts would be seen as lacking transparency, and therefore 
subject to scrutiny under the fairness test. Rather than Collins concern of “exempt[ing] 
                                           
132 Creating a new reading score methodology tends to be the response in the linguistics literature when 
identifying consistency problems with the scores or the calculators (see, for example, Manjira Sinha, ‘New 
Readability Measures for Bangla and Hindi Texts’ (2012) Proceedings of COLING 2012: Posters 1141, 1144). 
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insurance contracts from control,”133 such a test of plain and intelligible language has the 
potential to bring exclusions within the fairness regime, seemingly contrary to the intention 
of the drafters of the Unfair Terms Directive.134 It may be that analysis at clause level 
would produce some clauses that achieve acceptable reading scores, whilst others do not, 
but such a close focus is likely to reduce any efficiency gains of using reading scores. 
Therefore, it appears that reading scores may not provide an appropriate method for 
assessing plain and intelligible language, at least for core terms in insurance contracts, as 
they may bring terms within the fairness test which were intended to be excluded. 
However, it may be that exclusions drafted like those in our sample should be subject to 
the test for fairness, in order to encourage more transparent drafting and protect the 
consumer. 
Table 2: Mean Years of Education Required to Comprehend Each Contract 
Text Grand Weighted Mean 
(years of education) 
Travel Insurance Contract 1 16.29 
Travel Insurance Contract 2 19.06 
Travel Insurance Contract 3 15.95 
Travel Insurance Contract 4 16.35 
Travel Insurance Contract 5 13.86 
Travel Insurance Contract 6 14.05 
Travel Insurance Contract 7 15.06 
 
                                           
133 Collins, above n123. 
134 Directive 93/13/EEC recital 19. 
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Following the application of the reading scores it was necessary to consider whether 
reading scores reflect the intelligibility of the contracts. One way of doing this is to consider 
whether consumers understand the terms of contracts better when the reading score is 
more favourable. A study that looks at intelligibility is Davis.135 In one experiment he 
examined the ability of consumers to comprehend a contract. The contract was either an 
unchanged version of a consumer credit contract or was a redrafted version, simplified 
(reducing unnecessary clauses to reduce the possibility of information overload136) and 
amended for readability. The second group, who read the redrafted contract, scored 26% 
better on the test of their understanding. Vulnerable consumers (young and/or poor and/or 
African-American and/or inexperienced) showed the greatest improvement in their score 
when using the redrafted contract. Further experimentation showed that both 
simplification and redrafting for readability were necessary to achieve the increased 
understanding.  
Further studies on comprehension have found that contractual simplification has a positive 
effect for consumers. Masson and Waldron137 redrafted a contract by removing redundant 
or archaic terms, simplifying words and sentence structures and defining or simplifying 
legal terms. Comprehension, as measured by paraphrasing and question-answering tasks, 
was reliably and significantly enhanced by the use of simplified words and sentence 
                                           
135 Jeffrey Davis, ‘Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look at the 
Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts’ (1977) 63(6) Virginia Law Review 841. 
136 See Better Regulation Executive and National Consumer Council Warning: Too Much Information Can Harm 
(Final Report, November 2007). 
137 Michael Masson and Mary Anne Waldron, ‘Comprehension of Legal Contracts by Non-Experts: Effectiveness 
of Plain Language Redrafting’ (1994) 8 Applied Cognitive Psychology 67. 
This is the accepted version of this article and will subsequently appear in a typeset form 
in the journal. It should only be used for private research and study and may not be 
distributed further. The version of record can be accessed at [add doi when available] 
 
33 
 
structure. However, absolute levels of comprehension were still low. Further, defining and 
or simplifying legal terms did not have a significant impact on comprehension.138  
Using the vignettes to assess comprehension of the consequences of the terms, we found 
that lower reading scores did not necessarily translate to improved understanding. There 
was no significant correlation between reading score and correct applications of the 
contractual provisions to the vignettes. In all the contracts, our consumers did not, in 
general, understand the effect of the terms that they read. This may suggest that reading 
scores are not appropriate for operationalising “intelligibility.” However, a caveat must be 
advanced. None of the contracts examined had particularly low reading level. All required 
a post-16 educational level. Therefore, it may be the case that none of the contracts were 
sufficiently intelligible, and if a lower reading score were achieved then an increasing in 
intelligibility would be detected.139 
5 – Conclusion: Are Reading Scores Useful for Assessing Contractual Language 
Reading scores are an attractive tool for assessing contractual readability. They are easy 
to operate and cheap, and the process of assessment can be automated. Reading scores 
have the potential to function as a regulatory tool, and can be used both by businesses in 
drafting contacts and regulators in assessing contract that have been drafted. However, 
they have both strengths and weaknesses, and it is important to bear these in mind when 
considering the potential utility of reading scores in assessing contractual language. 
The Strengths of Reading Scores 
                                           
138 This is in contrast to Edith Greene et al, ‘Do People Comprehend Legal Language in Wills’ (2012) 26(4) Applied 
Cognitive Psychology 500. 
139 As suggested by Greene et al, Ibid. 
This is the accepted version of this article and will subsequently appear in a typeset form 
in the journal. It should only be used for private research and study and may not be 
distributed further. The version of record can be accessed at [add doi when available] 
 
34 
 
Our empirical work suggests that reading scores can play some role in assessing plain and 
intelligible language, but cannot play a complete role. Our examination showed, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, that the general exclusions clauses of travel insurance contracts needed a 
high level of education to comprehend. This might suggest that the clauses contained in 
the general exclusions are vulnerable to fairness assessment as they are not expressed in 
sufficiently plain and intelligible language. Reading scores may, therefore, have a role to 
play in assessing contractual language. 
The ease of conducting a reading scores assessment is an important factor in their favour. 
Reading score calculators are freely available, and computer programmes can be written 
to enable the assessment of large numbers of contracts quickly. Evidence of readability is 
provided in an easily comparable format, and the results can be understood relatively 
easily. 
However, when reading scores are used each different score formula will produce a 
different score for each contract. This is because of the different inputs that are taken into 
account. A trader may therefore be able to manipulate the reading score assigned to their 
contract through the choice of methodology. Therefore, if it were thought useful to use 
reading scores for the assessment of plain and intelligible language, it would be necessary 
to choose a particular reading score methodology. As has seen above this has been done 
in the USA, with Flesch or Flesch-Kincaid scores favoured,140 particularly because these 
are embedded within Microsoft Word.141 
If reading scores are to be used was combination of scores should be used, rather than 
relying on a single score and a single calculator, which appears to be the case in some of 
the US jurisdictions. One such method is explored above, and produces the Grand 
                                           
140 See above text to note 107ff. 
141 Sirico, above n113, 148, and see the critique of the Microsoft Word at text to n114ff. 
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Weighted Mean used in this paper. Combining scores has the benefit of smoothing some 
of the inconsistencies of the different methods of calculating reading scores, by taking all 
scores into account in making the calculation and producing a consensus as to the 
readability of each text under analysis. This approach is more likely to produce an 
operationalised measure of plain and intelligible language that assesses all dimensions of 
the concept. 
The Weaknesses of Reading Scores 
Nevertheless, further important caveats must be considered. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, 
the measures that we applied to the extracts have been devised and adopted for various 
application.142 While the ones used in the present analysis tend to be the most widely 
used, and indeed, are often the indicators used in the assessment of contracts, that is not, 
in and of itself, evidence that they are necessarily the best predictors of ease of text 
processing in the context of contracts. A typical limitation of grade-level readability 
estimates is that they were designed and intended for the analysis of school-age texts.143 
For this reason, they might be less sensitive to differences in complexity between highly 
technical texts and less appropriate for the analysis of the textual content aimed at adults 
to which they are routinely applied. Therefore, reading scores may be providing 
information about readability that does not conceptualise plain and intelligible language 
for adult contracting parties.  
Second, readability measures largely rely on assumptions based on surface-level features 
of texts, such as the number of different words or the frequency of rare words in a text, 
as well as the length and complexity of words and sentences. In so doing, they tend to 
                                           
142 Text to n86 above. 
143 See Janice Redish, ‘Readability formulas Have Even More Limitations Than Klare Discusses’ (2000) 24(3) ACM 
Journal of Computer Documentation 132 for a more in-depth analysis. See also Jack Selzer, ‘Readability is a Four 
Letter Word’ (1981) 18(4) International Journal of Business Communication 23. 
This is the accepted version of this article and will subsequently appear in a typeset form 
in the journal. It should only be used for private research and study and may not be 
distributed further. The version of record can be accessed at [add doi when available] 
 
36 
 
ignore other factors such as overall text coherence, 144 and, perhaps more significantly, 
the content of the text itself.145 For instance, a low-frequency or polysyllabic word will 
affect readability scores even though its meaning might be clearly and explicitly explained 
in the text, for example through a clear definition to which the reader is clearly signposted, 
and not pose a processing difficulty for the reader. Given this finding, reading scores 
appear to better at assessing whether the contractual document is plain, rather than 
assessing whether it is intelligible. A document that has a low reading score may not 
explain the “potentially significant economic consequences” of the term.146 On the other 
hand, a term which initially appears difficult may be understandable because of the way 
that it is presented, taking into account factors such as definitions and layout.147 Further, 
Pau and others, when examining the New Zealand tax code, found that changes from 
colons to semi-colons affected readability scores,148 a change that is unlikely to affect 
intelligibility and suggesting that reading scores could be manipulated without alterations 
to the text of that benefit the consumer being made. Therefore, if reading scores are to 
be taken into account, they should be seen as one measure of the difficulty of the text, 
but this should be balanced against measures that assess whether a consumer could 
understand the concepts expressed by the contract. 
                                           
144 Scott A. Crossley et al, ‘Text Readability and Intuitive Simplification: A Comparison of Readability Formulas’ 
(2011) 23(1) Reading in a Foreign Language 86. 
145 Discussed and rejected by Benson, above n4, 551ff. 
146 Dr Seuss, Green Eggs and Ham (HarperCollins, 2003) has a Flesh-Kincaid grade level of -1.3, but only using 
single syllable words in short sentences (the only polysyllabic word in Green Eggs and Ham is “anywhere”) is 
unlikely to be sufficient to explain the economic effects of a consumer contract. 
147 As alluded to by Andrew Smith J in Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National, discussed above text to n55. 
148 Caroline Pau et al, ‘Complexity of the New Zealand Tax Laws: An Empirical Study’ (2007) 22(1) Australian 
Tax Forum 59, 89. 
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This reflects Siroco’s critique of use of reading scores in State-level legislation in the US.149 
He argues that the use of reading scores in the contractual context leads to overreliance 
on technology, with the score providing the determination that a contract is “fair” and/or 
“plain and intelligible” (to adopt the language of the CRA 2015) if it achieves a certain 
readability score. He argues that “common sense tells us that sometimes a sentence with 
few words and syllables can be difficult to read and a sentence with many words and 
syllables can be quite comprehensible”150 and reliance solely on readability scores to 
protect consumers can therefore fail to achieve its goal. This reflects findings that reading 
scores are poor predictors of information gain,151 meaning that are not well equipped to 
assist with the determination of intelligibility.  
Furthermore, readability measures computed on these bases conceptually divorce the 
reader’s individual characteristics from the comprehension process and paint a relatively 
simplified picture of what is an otherwise highly interactive activity.152 The average 
consumer does not feature in reading scores, and the vulnerable consumer certainly does 
not.153 If the average consumer is to be the yardstick against which the language of terms 
is judged then simple reading score ares insufficient. It is necessary to, at least, consider 
the reading level of an average consumer. The Growing Up Digital Taskforce, looking at 
                                           
149 Siroco, above n113. 
150 Ibid. 170. 
151 R. Gay Funkhouser and Nathan Maccoby, Communicating Specialized Science to a Lay Audience (1971) 21 
Journal of Communication 58. 
152 R. Gay Funkhouser, ‘Functional Evaluation of Consumer Documents’ (1983) 20(3) Journal of Business 
Communication 59, 60 argues that reading scores that are “developed for ease of application…,” particularly by 
computers, are removed from “the measurement of actual vocabulary difficulty” reducing their usefulness in 
measuring consumer understanding. 
153 For example, in cross-border transactions, where the consumer may not be a native language speaker, a 
reading score is unlikely to capture whether the clause would be plain and intelligible to a second language 
speaker. 
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the understanding of terms and conditions by children, resolved this challenge by choosing 
a reading score matched to the level of education of an average 12-13 year old.154 This 
choice is not fully explained, as the report mentions users of Instagram in the 8-11 years 
old range, although Instagram’s terms require users to be over 13.155 This option will not 
be available whether the consumer is vulnerable for reasons other than age, as the 
expected comprehension level of the vulnerable consumer will not be so easily calculable. 
Further, it is necessary to explore what a being a reasonably well-informed, reasonable 
observant and reasonably circumspect consumer means in the contractual context. Even 
if a baseline of reading comprehension could be set, it is unlikely that a simple reading 
score can capture whether a reasonable consumer could understand a contract. 
Intelligibility, and being able to calculate the economic effects of a contract, goes beyond 
simply being able to read a contract. Indeed, it is possible that a contract, whilst 
understandable to a very young audience (as demonstrated by a low reading score), would 
not accurately communicate the effects of a contract. In some cases some level of 
complexity (although not excessive levels) may contribute to understanding of economic 
effects, despite increasing the reading score of a particular contract.  
Further, reading scores cannot account for behavioural effects. A consumer may perceive 
the economic effects of a contract differently depending on how the effects are framed. 
The consumers understanding of the effects of the contract will vary with the presentation 
of the terms, despite the contracts having the same or similar reading scores. Similarly, 
reading scores cannot account for the effects of layout on the understanding of consumers. 
                                           
154 Growing Up Digital, above n56, 8 footnote 2. 
155 Instagram Terms of Use, clause 1, available at <https://help.instagram.com/478745558852511> (last visited 
14th February 2017). The age limit of 13 appears generally in social media terms of use (see Snapchat 
(<https://www.snap.com/en-GB/terms/> clause 1); Facebook (<https://www.facebook.com/terms>, clause 
4(5)); and Twitter (<https://twitter.com/tos> clause 1). 
This is the accepted version of this article and will subsequently appear in a typeset form 
in the journal. It should only be used for private research and study and may not be 
distributed further. The version of record can be accessed at [add doi when available] 
 
39 
 
It seems therefore, that reading scores cannot provide determinative evidence that 
consumers can understand the effects of a contract. It may be very good evidence that a 
consumer cannot understand the effects. A reading score cannot be the sole evidence that 
a contract is not in plain, intelligible language. However, they may play a role in a 
multifactorial approach. 
What Role for Reading Scores? 
The weaknesses identified above do not mean that readability have no place in the process 
of composing and revising a text to maximise readability and comprehension, it does 
suggest that they should only represent one tool in the arsenal of a regulator, trader or 
lawyer. In other words, while readability measures can alert the writer of a text as to its 
relative complexity, they cannot identify specific processing and comprehension 
bottleneck. They may be able to identify whether a contract is expressed in plain language, 
but they cannot assess its intelligibility. A high reading score may function as good 
evidence that a document does not meet the plain and intelligible language requirements 
of the CRA, but should not be the only way that one assesses compliance. 
Reading scores can, when used as part of a more comprehensive evaluation of a text, play 
a role in assessing plain and intelligible language. In particular, they may help businesses 
when redrafting contracts. If reading scores are to be used, the tendency for different 
measures and different calculators to rely on various assumptions points to the need for 
an analysis approach that can at least partly offset these biases. The use of a Grand 
Weighted Mean, as used in this paper is to be encouraged. However, the issues identified 
in this paper suggest that reading scores alone should not be relied upon by business, 
regulators or courts in determining that contracts are transparent, and particularly 
determining that they can be understood by consumers. Assessing whether a contractual 
clause is expressed in plain and intelligible language requires the synergistic use of other 
methodologies that can more directly probe the processing and understanding of texts on 
the part of the reader. In this sense, a typical paradigm might involve the use of methods 
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to evaluate the ways that consumers read texts156 and comprehension questions to assess 
understanding and retention of information.157 Measures of other factors included in the 
CMA guidance may also be taken into account. Such an approach is unlikely to provide the 
simple, cheap, answers that reading scores might, but is more likely to appropriately 
gauge both the plainness and intelligibility of text by being able to consider both how the 
average consumer reads, and how a particular consumer reads. 
                                           
156 For example, eye-tracking. See Kathryn Conklin, Ana Pellicer-Sánchez, and Gareth Carrol, An introduction to 
eye-tracking: A guide for applied linguistics research (Cambridge University Press 2017). 
157 Jeffrey Davis, above n135. 
